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“Never Again!”  It was the overwhelming cry of those who looked upon the 
death and devastation brought about by World War II.  Together the nations of 
the world worked to implement a system that would prevent similar atrocities 
from happening again.  Quickly in the war’s aftermath those nations created the 
United Nations, whose main purpose was to protect international peace and 
security, and prevent aggressive wars.1  In a similar vein, they tasked the United 
Nations with protecting human rights.  The Preamble to the United Nations 
Charter that entered into force on October 24, 1945 begins: 
We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small . . . .2 
The modern human rights movement was birthed in this post-war attempt to 
start anew.  World War II had seen atrocities committed throughout the world, 
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 1. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
 2. Id. at 1035. 
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including the massacre of six million Jews, nearly two-thirds of the Jewish 
population living in Europe before the war.3  The death toll of the war was an 
almost unfathomable twenty million soldiers and forty-five million civilians.4  
The movement reacted to this evil, and the promotion of human rights was one 
of the crucial tools to protect the dignity and rights of all humans, and to confront 
and prevent this evil from resurging. 
One of the first fruits of this movement was the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved by the United Nations 
General Assembly and opened for signature on December 9, 1948.5  In it, states 
declared genocide to be a crime and committed themselves to working to prevent 
genocide and to punish individuals responsible, should it occur again.6  One day 
later, the General Assembly—remarkably, without dissent—approved the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.7  The Universal Declaration proclaimed 
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”8  In its 
thirty articles, the Declaration identified fundamental rights that belong to all 
humans regardless of race, national origin, sex, power, or wealth.9  These rights 
range from the right to life, to freedom from arbitrary arrest, to the right to 
work.10 
The Universal Declaration was a historic achievement.  Harvard Law School 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has called it “the single most important reference 
point for cross-cultural discussion of human freedom and dignity in the world 
today.”11  In the decades that followed, states committed themselves to many 
human rights treaties.  Some treaties were created through the United Nations 
and others arose through the work of regional human rights organizations such 
as the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African 
                                                 
 3. DAVID WEISSBRODT, FIONNUALA NI AOLÁIN, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 9 (4th ed. 2009). 
 4. Fred R. Nadis, World War II, World History: The Modern Era, ABC-
CLIO, https://worldhistory2.abc-clio.com/Topics/Display/33 (last visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
 5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
1951 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 6. Id. at 280. 
 7. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter Declaration of Human Rights]; History of the Document, U.N., 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html (last visited Jan. 
30, 2019). 
 8. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, at art. 1. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id. at arts. 3, 9, 23. 
 11. Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1998). 
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Union.12  Some treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),13 address a wide number of rights; others, like the Convention 
Against Torture,14 focus on one particular right. 
Beyond the drafting and ratifying of conventions, since 1945 the human rights 
movement has created a complex human rights enforcement structure.  The 
United Nations boasts a number of offices and entities created pursuant to the 
U.N. Charter, such as the Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights.15  It also deploys additional human rights enforcement bodies 
tasked with enforcing specific treaties, such as the Human Rights Committee 
that exists only to give effect to the ICCPR.16  The regional systems likewise 
have established bodies to enforce human rights, including commissions and 
even human rights courts that have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of human 
rights violations.17 
In significant ways, this system of declarations, conventions, and enforcement 
bodies has successfully promoted human dignity and restrained evil.  The human 
rights movement should be justly proud of progress it has made on challenging 
issues like enforced disappearances of individuals in South America18 and the 
protection of religious liberty in Europe.19  Human rights standards are openly 
discussed and violations are tracked and reported.  Historically, some western 
nations have conditioned the grant of international aid on compliance with 
human rights standards.20  Many former Eastern Bloc states have abandoned 
totalitarianism and are now evaluated as “free” in Freedom House’s annual 
assessment of the protection of civil and political rights around the world.21  This 
transition to states that protect civil and political rights, and the rule of law was 
                                                 
 12. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; Statute 
of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, E.T.S. No. 1; African (Banjul) Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. 
 13. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 
1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 14. G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10,1984) [hereinafter Convention on Torture]. 
 15. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/251, Human Rights Council (Mar. 15, 2006). 
 16. Human Rights Committee, OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2018). 
 17. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 12; Statute of the Council of 
Europe, supra note 12; Banjul Charter, supra note 12. 
 18. Enforced Disappearances: Progress and Challenges in South America, OHCHR (Aug. 
31, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Enforced-Disappearances-progress-and-
challenges-in-South-America.aspx. 
 19. JEFFREY A. BRAUCH, FLAWED PERFECTION 87 (2017). 
 20. See generally The Law Library of Congress, Regulation of Foreign Aid in Selected 
Countries 2011/2012 10, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/regulation-foreign-aid.pdf 
(providing a collection of reports detailing how countries around the world handle foreign aid). 
 21. Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 
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greatly aided by the European Union conditioning membership on states’ 
commitment to protecting basic human rights.22 
This story about confronting evil cannot end here, however.  While the human 
rights movement sees and confronts evil “out there,” it often fails to recognize 
that evil affects all of us, including those of us dedicated to promoting human 
rights.  Like all humans and human-created institutions, we, and the entities we 
establish, are tempted to engage in self-dealing and assert authority without 
accountability.  At times, individuals and states use human rights language and 
institutions to disguise or even achieve evil ends. 
The human rights movement is particularly susceptible to the vice of hubris.  
Hubris is “excessive pride or self-confidence.”23  While pride can have positive 
aspects—for example, the human rights movement can appropriately take pride 
in the number of states around the world that have banned human trafficking—
hubris is a vice.  It is a form of pride that can cause harm.  Yale Professor Donald 
Kagan defines hubris as “a kind of violent arrogance which comes upon men 
when they see themselves as more than human and behave as if they were 
divine.”24  Kagan highlights the Greek origins of the concept, noting that the 
great temple of Apollo at Delphi featured these inscriptions: “Know Thyself,” 
and “Nothing in Excess.”25  He says that together these warned ambitious 
Greeks: “[k]now your own limitations as a fallible mortal and then exercise 
moderation because you are not divine, you are mortal.”26  Kagan likewise 
describes the Greek view this way: “[m]an is potent and important, yet he is 
fallible and mortal, capable of the greatest achievements and the worst crimes.”27 
Such hubris infects—and threatens—the human rights movement.  The 
movement recognizes there is evil in the world; that is why the movement exists.  
But it fails to recognize that we ourselves—like all humans—are flawed.  This 
hubris particularly shows itself in two ways.  First, the movement has embraced 
a utopian expansion of rights to be protected.  The view resembles that from the 
movie Field of Dreams: if we build it they will come.  If we simply identify 
something as a fundamental human right, that right will be promoted and 
enforced.  Second, the movement has a utopian view of the bodies created to 
                                                 
 22. Edwin Rekosh, Constructing Public Interest Law: Transnational Collaboration and 
Exchange in Central and Eastern Europe, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 55, 71–73 (2008); 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUR. COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2019). 
 23. Hubris, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hubris (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 24. Donald Kagan, Ancient Greek History Course: Lecture 1, at 21:17 (Nov. 20, 2008) 
(downloaded using iTunes). 
 25. Id. at 11:24. 
 26. Id. at 11:35. 
 27. Id. at 31:35. 
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enforce human rights.  The assumption is that if we set up an organization with 
a noble purpose, it will achieve noble aims.  Both assumptions are false.  Our 
expansion of rights claims—both in the number and scope of these claims—has 
begun to dilute the significance of rights and at times even diminish their 
enforcement.  And we have too often established human rights enforcement 
bodies lacking proper checks and balances. 
Despite its many successes, in its hubris, the human rights movement has not 
fulfilled its promise to restrain evil—and, indeed, its future ability to do so is 
endangered—because it fails to recognize these flaws within itself.  This article 
tells the story of that failure. 
At the Regent University Center for Global Justice, Human Rights, and the 
Rule of Law28  our mission is to help train the next generation of advocates to 
protect the poor, oppressed, and enslaved around the world, and to serve those 
already doing this important work.29  Every year our students and graduates are 
deployed in internships and fellowships around the globe, working with 
organizations that do outstanding work to prevent human trafficking, promote 
religious liberty, and protect the land rights of vulnerable populations.30  Alumni 
are currently prosecuting sexual abusers and protecting widows from land 
grabbing.31 
It is affection for and a commitment to protecting human rights that prompts 
this Article.  This Article will first explore the ways hubris has hindered the 
protection of rights, both by looking at the utopian expansion of rights claims 
and by looking at the lack of accountability and transparency in human rights 
organizations.  It will then offer suggestions for how we can, with humility and 
proper expectations, achieve the goal of protecting the rights and dignity of all 
humans, and effectively confront and prevent evil. 
I. UTOPIAN EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS 
A. Extent of the Expansion of Human Rights Claims 
One of the most striking developments in the world of human rights since 
1945 has been the breathtaking expansion in the number and scope of asserted 
rights.  The idealism fueling this expansion should not have been a surprise.  
From the beginning, the notion of protecting human rights was visionary and 
idealistic.  Indeed, Yale professor Samuel Moyn insists that protecting human 
rights is inherently utopian: 
                                                 
 28. The author serves as the executive director of the University’s Center for Global Justice, 
Human Rights, and the Rule of Law.  Faculty, REGENT U., https://www.regent.edu/school-of-
law/faculty/jd-jeffrey-a-brauch/. 
 29. Mission & Vision, REGENT U. SCH. OF L., CTR FOR GLOBAL JUST., HUM. RTS, & THE 
RULE OF L., https://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/globaljustice/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
 30. Id. at Internship and Fellowship Programs. 
 31. Id. at Alumni Profiles. 
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The phrase [“human rights”] implies an agenda for improving the 
world, and bringing about a new one in which the dignity of each 
individual will enjoy secure international protection.  It is a 
recognizably utopian program: for the political standards it champions 
and the emotional passion it inspires, this program draws on the image 
of a place that has not yet been called into being.  It promises to 
penetrate the impregnability of state borders, slowly replacing them 
with the authority of international law.  It prides itself on offering 
victims the world over the possibility of a better life.32 
Idealism can be good.  It can inspire hope and motivate action.  The idealism 
of human rights is partly what attracted many to engage with the human rights 
movement.  But that idealism becomes hubris when we make the unjustified 
assumption that by simply asserting something as a human right, it will naturally 
be embraced and enforced.  Professor Eric Posner highlights this distinction and 
argues that the human rights movement has indeed crossed the line from noble 
and helpful idealism to hubris.  He writes: 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the human rights treaties 
were not so much an act of idealism as an act of hubris, with more than 
a passing resemblance to the civilizing efforts undertaken by western 
governments and missionary groups in the 19th century, which did 
little good for native populations while entangling European powers 
in the affairs of countries they did not understand.  A humbler 
approach is long overdue.33 
The Universal Declaration consists of 30 articles proclaiming a variety of 
rights.  Some are broad, such as the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, 
and the right to education.34  Such rights are referred to as economic, social, and 
cultural rights—or sometimes second generation (human) rights.35 
Most, though, are civil and political rights: rights to life, to be free from 
arbitrary arrest, to not be enslaved, and to have freedom of religion and 
expression.36  These are sometimes referred to as first generation (human) 
rights.37  In general terms, first generation rights typically impose limits on 
government power as opposed to second generation rights, which mandate an 
expansion of government roles or power for their enforcement.38 
                                                 
 32. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 1 (2010). 
 33. Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights. 
 34. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, arts. 23–24, 26. 
 35. H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 
133–34 (David P. Forsythe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999). 
 36. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7. 
 37. CONDÉ, supra note 35, at 46. 
 38. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-rights.  This is not always the case.  For example, Article 
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Since 1948, the number and types of rights enumerated in human rights 
declarations and treaties has greatly expanded.  The Freedom Rights Project 
calculates that a European state has the option to ratify 27 different treaties 
created under the auspices of the United Nations and another 37 treaties created 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe.39  Professors Jacob Mchangama 
and Guglielmo Verdirame, two of the founders of the Freedom Rights Project, 
calculate that this results in 1377 different obligations to which a European state 
may commit itself.40  Of course, some of these obligations are duplicative, but 
nonetheless, the number of potential commitments is large. 
In recent years, the expansion of human rights has not simply been a matter 
of mathematics; many of the rights being articulated are themselves much more 
expansive in their scope and reach.  And while there has been general agreement 
for many years over the nature of core civil and political rights, such as the right 
to life and the right to be free from slavery, there is much less agreement about 
the scope of some rights being advocated currently. 
Today, for example, there is much more emphasis on a third category of 
human rights that is significantly different from those described above.  This 
generation of rights consists of what is known as “collective” or “group rights.”41  
Group rights, which have been largely advanced by nations emerging from 
colonialism, extend entitlements to not just individuals but “peoples.”42  The 
name of the primary African human rights convention, the African (Banjul) 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, reflects this perspective.43 
Group rights tend to make very broad claims. African Charter Article 24 states 
for example: “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favorable to their development.”44  While a noble aspiration, its 
                                                 
8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts: “Everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him 
by the constitution or by law.”  Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 8. The fulfillment 
of this right requires governments to establish a justice system to investigate and prosecute criminal 
offenses. 
 39. JACOB MCHANGAMA & GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME, FREEDOM RIGHTS PROJECT: HUMAN 
RIGHTS INFLATION 10–12 (2013), http://www.freedomrights.info/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/HR-Inflation.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 12. 
 41. CONDÉ, supra note 35, at 19. 
 42. See generally Richard N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 80, 80 (1988) (discussing how the Banjul Charter 
departed from contemporary human rights instruments in how it defined “people”). 
 43. See Banjul Charter, supra note 12. 
 44. Id. at art. 24. 
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breadth and general nature leave very unclear who exercises this right or how it 
might be enforced.45 
Group rights are not just an African phenomenon.  The U.N. General 
Assembly, for example, has declared that both individuals and groups have the 
right to development: “The right to development is an inalienable human right 
by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, 
in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”46  
Note the breathtaking scope of this asserted right.  The right to development has 
broad reaching implications for all political, economic, social, and cultural facets 
of life.47 
Many recent expressions of rights claims reflect this tendency to swell the 
scope of asserted entitlements.  While these expanded rights often use idealistic 
and inspiring language, they can also be vague, utopian, unclear as to what is 
included in the right, and how that right should be enforced.  Professor David 
Smolin describes it this way: “The language of human rights has in many 
respects already been reduced to the role of vacuous platitudes which evoke 
warm feelings and high ideals but are not intended to contribute to the hard work 
of settling disputes or governing peoples.”48 
One of the best recent examples of the broad and utopian expansion of human 
rights is found in the recent Declaration on the Right to Peace, approved on 
December 19, 2016 by the United Nations General Assembly.49  The declaration 
was the culmination of an eight year process that began in 2009 with a workshop 
to explore the notion of a right to peace.50  A year later, the United Nations 
Human Rights Council adopted a resolution tasking an advisory committee with 
preparing a draft declaration.51  In 2012, the Council established a working group 
to specify just what was encompassed within the right to peace.52 
From the beginning, not everyone agreed that peace should—or could—be 
enshrined as a human right.  Some Western states expressed concern over the 
                                                 
 45. Jack Donnelly, In Defense of the Universal Declaration Model, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF GROUPS 20, 32–33 (Lyons 
et al. eds., 2003). 
 46. G.A. Res. 41/128, annex, Declaration on the Right to Development, art.1, para. 1 (Dec. 4, 
1986). 
 47. Id. 
 48. David M. Smolin, Church, State, and International Human Rights: A Theological 
Appraisal, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1515, 1535 (1998). 
 49. See G.A. Res. 32/28, annex, Declaration on the Right to Peace (July 1, 2016). 
 50. Christian Guillermet-Fernández & David Fernández Puyana, The General Assembly 
Adopts the Declaration on the Right to Peace, 2 ERUDITIO 39, 44 (2017), 
http://eruditio.worldacademy.org/files/vol2issue3/reprints/Eruditio-v2-i3-right-to-peace-
cfernandez-dpuyana-reprint.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 44–45. 
 52. Id. at 45. 
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breadth and vagueness of the proposed right.  Early on, representatives of the 
European Union objected that there is no agreed upon definition of peace nor an 
agreement as to who would be the right-holders and duty-bearers of such a 
right.53  The United States also argued: “The proposed right is neither recognized 
nor defined in any universal, binding instrument, and its parameters are entirely 
unclear.  Nor is there any consensus, in theory or in state practice, as to what 
such a right would entail.”54 
Nonetheless, a more utopian impulse prevailed.  Some delegations opined that 
the  
current initiative on the right to peace could become a great 
opportunity to stop wars and armed conflicts in the world and 
consequently, to avoid all human rights violations . . . . [This initiative 
is] also a means [to an agreement as to who would be the rights-
bearers and duty-bearers of such a right] to eliminate all kinds of 
violence against people.55 
The Declaration’s text certainly reflects this utopian vision.  It sets forth a very 
broad definition of peace: “Recognizing that peace is not only the absence of 
conflict but also requires a positive, dynamic, participatory process where 
dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual 
understanding and cooperation, and socio-economic development is ensured.”56 
The Declaration’s prefatory language very much ties the right to peace with 
the fulfillment of group rights: “Acknowledging that the fuller development of 
a culture of peace is integrally linked to the realization of the right of all peoples 
. . . to self-determination . . . .”57 
The Declaration’s operative language, though short, is likewise broad: 
Article 1.  Everyone has the right to enjoy peace such that all human 
rights are promoted and protected and development is fully realized. 
Article 2.  States should respect, implement and promote equality and 
non-discrimination, justice and the rule of law, and guarantee freedom 
from fear and want as a means to build peace within and between 
societies.58 
The Declaration is eloquent.  It lays out a noble vision.  But that eloquence 
and nobility do not somehow transform the declared right into something with a 
clear meaning that is attainable or enforceable. 
                                                 
 53. Id. at 43. 
 54. Karima Bennoune, A Peace of Her, 19 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 63, 65 (2015). 
 55. Guillermet-Fernández & Puyana, supra note 50, at 46. 
 56. G.A. Res. 71/189, annex, Declaration on the Right to Peace, at 3 (Dec. 19, 2016). 
 57. Id. at 2. 
 58. Id. at 5.  By referencing a right to be free from fear and want, the Declaration consciously 
associates itself with President Roosevelt’s historic World War II call for the world to embrace four 
essential freedoms: freedom of expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom 
from fear.  CONDÉ, supra note 35, at 47. 
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The Declaration on the Right to Peace reflects a view that is becoming more 
commonplace: if something is good for human flourishing it must be declared 
to be a human right.  Professor S. Matthew Liao displays this view when he 
advocates for recognition of the right of children to be loved: 
[T]he right of children to be loved is a human right.  Specifically, my 
argument is that human beings have human rights to the fundamental 
conditions for pursuing a good life.  As human beings, children 
therefore have human rights to the fundamental conditions for 
pursuing a good life.  Being loved is a fundamental condition for 
children to pursue a good life.  Therefore, children have a right to be 
loved.59 
Only the most heartless among us could quarrel with the virtue of children 
being loved.  But that does not mean that this should be articulated as a human 
right subject to international promotion and enforcement. 
This sweeping expansion of what is meant by human rights is not just a matter 
of academic discussion.  It animates the day-to-day work of key human rights 
institutions and officials.  For example, in February 2014, the Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights announced with fanfare that the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights was launching a new study on 
the effect of advertising on cultural rights, including “the right of people to 
choose their way of life.”60  Specifically, the Special Rapporteur, Farida 
Shaheed, expressed concern over the effect that billboards and public screens 
were having on viewers world-wide.  She insisted that “[o]ne underlying 
problem relates to the impact that advertising and marketing practices may have 
on cultural diversity and the right of people to choose their way of life.”61 
B. Problems with the Proliferation of Rights 
Why should we be concerned with the expansion in the number and scope of 
asserted rights?  First, simply asserting more rights—and even convincing states 
to embrace those rights in treaties—does not actually lead to greater protection 
of rights.  Second, and worse, the proliferation of rights may at times interfere 
with the protection of human rights. 
                                                 
 59. S. MATTHEW LIAO, THE RIGHT TO BE LOVED 7 (2015). 
 60. U.N. Expert Kicks off New Study on the Impact of Advertising and Marketing on Cultural 
Rights, OHCHR (Feb. 7, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14227&LangID=E. 
 61. Id.  In a further example of Shaheed’s broad focus, she warned of the threat posed to 
cultural rights in Vietnam by tourists seeking to hear the Cong drum.  Shaheed said [the Cong drum] 
is “being played on demand for tourists in some places, thus clearly losing its original cultural 
significance.”  Pedro Pizano, The Human Rights that Dictators Love, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 26, 
2014, 3:45 PM), http://foreign policy.com/2014/02/26/the-human-rights-that-dictators-
love/. 
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1. The Proliferation of Rights Does Not Lead to Greater Protection of Rights 
For nearly twenty years, researchers studied the impact declarations and 
treaties had on human rights compliance.  The results demonstrate that the 
existence of more treaties—and more states ratifying them—does not mean real 
compliance and protection for human rights.  In 1999, political science professor 
Linda Camp Keith analyzed the relationship between states ratifying the ICCPR 
and their respect for the rights included in it.62  In 2002, Yale Law Professor 
Oona Hathaway performed a similar analysis on the effect that ratifying a variety 
of human rights treaties had on compliance with the rights covered within 
them.63  “Both studies find no statistically significant relationship, and Hathaway 
argues that the relationship in some cases is actually negative.”64 
More recent data affirms this conclusion.  In 2013, Professor Emilie Hafner-
Burton published the results of her study on the impact that ratifying the ICCPR 
had on the levels of government-sponsored murder, torture, political 
imprisonment, and forced disappearances.  She found that the fact that a country 
has ratified the ICCPR has little to do with whether the country will actually 
comply with it.  Some comply, others do not.  On average, though, “there is little 
change—for better or worse—even decades after most countries ratify . . . .  
[T]he vast majority of countries keep acting the way they did before they 
ratified.”65 
Perhaps the most disheartening conclusion from Hafner-Burton’s research is 
“the evidence that participation in some treaties correlates with worse human 
rights behavior.  That is, some countries that ratify some treaties actually engage 
in violations of those rights more frequently after they ratify than countries that 
do not ratify.”66 
Some of the worst human rights abusers are regular endorsers of human rights 
documents.  For example, North Korea has ratified both the ICCPR and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).67  
                                                 
 62. See generally Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. OF PEACE RES. 
95, 95 (1999) (suggesting that parties to this international covenant may not produce an observable 
impact on the state party’s actual behavior). 
 63. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE. L. J. 1935, 
1939 (2002) (suggesting that noncompliance with treaty obligations appears to be common among 
parties). 
 64. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 
(2006). 
 65. EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 73 (2013). 
 66. Id. at 75.  Law Professor Eric Posner notes that “[e]ach of the six major human rights 
treaties has been ratified by more than 150 countries, yet many of them remain hostile to human 
rights. This raises the nagging question of how much human rights law has actually influenced the 
behaviour of governments.”  Posner, supra note 33. 
 67. See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2019). 
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Sudan has ratified these conventions as well as the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.68  Of course, these 
ratifications did not deter Sudan from committing genocide against Africans in 
the Darfur region of the country in the century’s first decade.69 
It is clear that if we want human rights to be concretely protected, much more 
is needed than creating declarations or treaties, or even ratifying them.70  
Idealistic and utopian aspirations are not enough. 
2. Human Rights Proliferation Can Actually Be Harmful 
Much more concerning than the conclusion that the proliferation of human 
rights does not help is that it may actually hurt.  In significant ways, human rights 
may be more poorly protected as we continue to expand the number of rights 
affirmed or treaties ratified. 
The reason expansion of human rights may actually thwart rights enforcement 
relates to the hubris discussed in the introduction.  With excessive and 
unwarranted self-confidence, the human rights movement implicitly assumes 
that when states choose to ratify human rights conventions, they act out of good 
faith, with at least the intention to comply with convention terms.  But states do 
not always engage in good faith. Some regularly ratify human rights instruments 
with no intention of complying with their terms.71  And sometimes they use 
human rights language and institutions to disguise or even achieve evil ends.72  
And this becomes easier to do as the number of human rights norms increases. 
Why would nations ratify conventions with no intention of compliance?  At a 
basic level, it is relatively easy to ratify a convention, gaining international 
political capital for doing so, while it is rare that a state will face serious 
consequences for failing to comply.  This is especially true given that the human 
rights enforcement system is quite stretched in its resources.  Professor Hafner-
Burton notes the likely consequence: “Expansion [of rights], especially in the 
context of an already thinly stretched bureaucracy, probably will lead to more 
lawbreaking, and further erode the credibility and legitimacy of the system.”73 
                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. BRAUCH, supra note 19, at 95–97, 101. 
 70. Posner, supra note 33; see also STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
142 (2013) (defining “Hubris: pride, arrogance, an overestimation of one’s capabilities.  The 
humanist metanarrative gives the impression that the success of norms lies in their inherent justness; 
that is, the norms are their own best advocates, their inner demand for justice persuasive in and of 
itself.  But mobilization politically requires a lot more.”). 
 71. Joshua Keating, Why Countries Make Human Rights Pledges They Have No Intention of 
Honoring, SLATE (Oct. 21, 2014, 3:13 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/10/why-
countries-make-human-rights-pledges-they-have-no-intention-of-honoring.html. 
 72. Pizano, supra note 61. 
 73. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 65, at 130.  The principle that multiplying unenforceable 
legal prohibitions actually leads to lawlessness has been acknowledged for centuries.  Thomas 
Aquinas famously urged that human law should not prescribe all virtues or proscribe all vices. 
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More troubling is that ratifying numerous human rights instruments can 
become a tool to intentionally thwart meaningful human rights enforcement.  
States with a history of violating basic civil and political rights can turn to their 
track record of supporting expansive or vague group or cultural rights and show 
a “good human rights record.”  Pedro Pizano, Strategy and Development 
Associate for the Human Rights Foundation, describes the dynamic: 
Yet, it is precisely because of this proliferation that states can cherry-
pick the rights whose obligations they promise to fulfill sometime in 
the future—and thus, show off a “good” human rights record, even as 
they fail to uphold even the most basic civil and political rights.  
Desirable outcomes like housing or health care—better understood as 
political goals—were cloaked in rights language to make them seem 
more legitimate.74 
Professor Jacob Mchangama similarly argues: 
When everything can be defined as a human right, the premium on 
violating such rights is cheap . . . .  By presenting themselves as the 
champions of these third-generation rights, illiberal states seek to both 
remove the moral high ground from civil and political rights and to 
achieve political legitimacy.  Rights proliferation is being abused by 
dictatorships to praise each other, and is diminishing the moral clarity 
that human rights once enjoyed.75 
Mchangama compares human rights to a currency that 
has been seriously devalued through the process of rights inflation 
taking place in international organizations.  And in its devalued state 
the currency of human rights is sometimes more likely to buy cover 
and legitimacy for dictatorships than purchase protection against the 
abuse of citizens by such states and thereby undermine the core values 
of liberty and the rule of law that underpin human rights.76 
                                                 
Instead, “human law does not prohibit all vices from which the virtuous abstain but only the more 
serious ones from which it is possible for the majority to abstain . . . .”  SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, 
THE TREATISE ON LAW 316 (R. J. Henle ed., 1993). 
 74. Pizano, supra note 61. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Freedom Rights Project, International Human Rights: Problems & Solutions, YOUTUBE 
1:09–1:36 (Jan. 30, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NTtCa3eNDfw&list=PLTOiPfXv5mili1YyvVUhAmk44OV
9ho0oj&index=3.  This is not a new phenomenon.  In 1991, Phillip Allott warned: 
[I]n all societies governments have been reassured in their arrogance by the idea that, 
if they are not proved actually to be violating the substance of particularized human 
rights, if they can bring their willing and acting within the wording of this or that 
formula with its lawyerly qualifications and exceptions, then they are doing well 
enough.  The idea of human rights should intimidate governments or it is worth 
nothing.  If the idea of human rights reassures governments it is worse than nothing. 
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These expressions of concern are not idle speculation.  There is ample 
evidence that some states use the language or institutional structure of human 
rights to protect themselves from scrutiny or criticism.  Professors Rosa 
Freedman and Jacob Mchangama conducted a study of how states respond to 
proposals for special procedures at the United Nations Human Rights Council.77  
The Human Rights Council uses special procedures to empower independent 
human rights experts to report and advise on the human rights situation relating 
to a specific country or to a particular right.  Freedman and Mchangama 
compared the behavior of nations evaluated as “free” by Freedom House with 
that of states evaluated “not free” and found a wide disparity between how free 
and non-free states support or oppose special procedure mandates depending on 
the type of right at stake.78 
Non-free states “rarely” supported the creation of mandates dealing with civil 
and political rights, which were more focused and where violations could be 
clearly identified and adjudicated.79  But they regularly supported creating 
mandates dealing with broader and more aspirational—and less obviously 
enforceable—people’s, and economic and social rights.80  Significantly, free 
states acted in just the opposite way.81 
In the same way, states with poor records of enforcing basic civil and political 
rights frequently support the recognition of broader, vaguer, and less enforceable 
rights.  A good example occurred in 2008 in conjunction with a working group 
on an optional protocol to the ICESCR entitled, “Promotion and Protection of 
All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development.”82  Notes from the working committee 
report the following: “252.  The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the protocol 
provided an opportunity to reiterate the equal status of all human rights.”83  
Contrast Iran’s enthusiastic response to such a broad rights affirmation with the 
more cautious response from the United Kingdom: “246.  The United Kingdom 
reserved its position on the draft.  It remained sceptical about the practical 
benefits of the protocol, considering that economic, social and cultural rights 
                                                 
PHILIP ALLOT, EUNOMIA: NEW WORLD ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 288 (1991). 
 77. See Rosa Freedman & Jacob Mchangama, Expanding or Diluting Human Rights?: The 
Proliferation of United Nations Special Procedures Mandates, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 164, 165 (2016). 
 78. Id. at 171. 
 79. Id. at 181. 
 80. Id. at 180–81. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Rep. of the Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/7 
(May 6, 2008). 
 83. Id. at 30. 
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did not lend themselves to adjudication in the same way as civil and political 
rights.”84 
Why might states that abuse basic civil and political rights want to expand the 
collection of human rights norms?  They leave more room to hide.  A year after 
this working group, Iran held an election that was widely viewed as rigged.85  
The government used violence to put down demonstrators who spoke out in 
opposition.86  Although denying basic rights of expression and association, when 
questioned on its human rights record, Iran could point to its strong record on 
the right to development. 
Iran is not alone.  Less than a year before its bloody civil war began, Syria 
invited special rapporteurs on the right to food and health to visit the nation.  The 
special rapporteurs: 
generally praised the human rights record of Syria but were silent on 
the repressive nature of the regime.  The Special Rapporteur on the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health stated that: “Syria’s commendable work 
in the last three decades to improve the health system as a whole, and 
its commitment to ensure access to healthcare for all” with regard to 
concerns the Special Rapporteur “noted with dismay that smoking is 
still highly prevalent in Syria.”87 
While Syria embraced these investigations, Syria had ignored multiple 
requests from special rapporteurs on torture and treatment of human rights 
defenders, and from working groups on forced disappearances and arbitrary 
detention.88  Within months the Syrian government would use military force 
against its own people, even using chemical weapons in 2013.89  Since 2011, the 
civil war has killed over 400,000 Syrians.90  While Syria blatantly violated basic 
                                                 
 84. Id. at 29. 
 85. See, e.g., Simon Robinson, Was Ahmadinejad’s Win Rigged?, TIME (June 15, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1904645_1904644_1904643,00.ht
ml#. 
 86. Violence Grips Tehran Amid Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2009), 
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html. 
 87. Freedman & Mchangama, supra note 77, at 191 (quoting U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health: 
Visit to Syria, 6-14 Nov. 2010.  Preliminary observations, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10532&LangID=E). 
 88. Id. 
 89. ‘Clear and Convincing’ Evidence of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, U.N. Team Reports, 
U.N. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013), https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/449052-clear-and-convincing-
evidence-chemical-weapons-use-syria-un-team-reports. 
 90. John Hudson, U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 22, 
2016, 4:14 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/22/u-n-envoy-revises-syria-death-toll-to-
400000/. 
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civil and political rights of its own people, it was able to hide behind its “good 
human rights record.” 
There are in fact many such examples of nations sheltering themselves or their 
allies from human rights scrutiny by embracing the expansion of human rights—
especially the expansion of second and third generation rights: 
[A]t its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the UN Human 
Rights Council in December 2011, the criticism of Zimbabwe by 
democratic countries was accompanied by acclaim from the likes of 
Angola, Sri Lanka, and North Korea for its efforts to promote socio-
economic rights.  Likewise at its 2010 UPR North Korea was praised 
by Iran, Cuba, Syria and Russia for, inter alia, working ‘to consolidate 
a socialist and just society, which guarantees equality and social 
justice.’91 
States not only protect themselves by sheltering under the ever-expanding 
treaty system, certain nations at times claim the “right” to engage in behavior 
that actually thwarts basic civil and political rights. 
China cites “the right to development” to explain why the Chinese 
government gives priority to economic growth over political 
liberalisation.  Many countries cite the “right to security,” a catch-all 
idea that protection from crime justifies harsh enforcement methods.  
Vladimir Putin cited the rights of ethnic minorities in Ukraine in order 
to justify his military intervention there . . . .92 
A particularly destructive form of using rights language to actually restrict 
rights is seen in the rise of prohibitions of what is known as “defamation of 
religion.”93  Freedoms of religion and expression have been embraced from the 
beginning of the human rights movement as foundational, core rights.  For 
example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights proclaims: 
Article 18.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.94 
                                                 
 91. Mchangama & Verdirame, supra note 39, at 18.  Similarly, “China has repeatedly 
undertaken considerable efforts to avert, through procedural means, the adoption of a critical 
resolution on its own human rights situation.”  GERD OBERLEITNER, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS 9 (2007).  While the expansion of rights can provide cover for a repressive regime 
to shield its own record, it also can provide a platform from which to attack the moral failings of 
others.  For example, North Korea insisted before the Human Rights Council that “it is a well-
known fact that the US is the worst human rights violator in the world.”  ROSA FREEDMAN, FAILING 
TO PROTECT: THE U.N. AND THE POLITICISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (2014). 
 92. Posner, supra note 33. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 18. 
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Article 19.  Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.95 
These rights are also enshrined in the ICCPR and specified in greater detail.96 
Despite these venerable protections, an influential group of states has sought 
to restrict the freedom of religion and expression, and it has done so in the very 
name of human rights.  It has been led by the Organisation of the Islamic 
Cooperation, an organization consisting of 57 states that seek to restrict speech 
that it deems critical of Mohammed, Islam, or Muslims.97  Many such states 
place strong restrictions on speech and religion domestically, generally 
prohibiting conversion to religions other than Islam and banning proselytizing.98 
These states have also turned to the international community—and human 
rights institutions in particular—to restrict proselytizing and speech deemed 
critical of Muslims in non-Muslim nations.  The Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) has been particularly successful in its efforts before the 
Human Rights Council.  In 2008, with strong OIC backing, the Human Rights 
Council passed a resolution condemning speech that is critical of Islam99 and 
declared that such speech actually undermines human rights: “Defamation of 
religions is among the causes of social disharmony and instability, at the national 
and international levels, and leads to violations of human rights.”100  The 
resolution likewise asserted: “[R]espect of religions and their protection from 
contempt is an essential element conducive for the exercise by all of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”101 
The resolution “urges” nations to restrict the freedom of expression to stop 
the spread of critical expression.  Article 8 “[u]rges States to take actions to 
prohibit the dissemination, including through political institutions and 
organizations, of racist and xenophobic ideas and material aimed at any religion 
                                                 
 95. Id. at art. 19. 
 96. ICCPR, supra note 13, at arts. 18–19. 
 97. History, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oic-
oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en (last visited June 30, 2019); Robert C. Blitt, Defamation 
of Religion: Rumors of Its Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 347, 352 
(2011). 
 98. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2017) 
[hereinafter USCIRF ANN. REP. 2017]; see also infra text accompanying note 107. 
 99. While this resolution speaks of defamation of religion in general, it addresses the increase 
in Islamophobia, in particular, following the events of September 11, 2001.  Human Rights Council 
Res. 7/19 (Mar. 27, 2008). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at para. 10. 
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or its followers that constitute incitement to racial and religious hatred, hostility 
or violence.”102  The resolution passed 21 to 10 (with 14 abstentions).103 
In 2010, the Human Rights Council passed another resolution condemning the 
defamation of religions (this time including Judaism and Christianity by 
name).104  The vote on this resolution was closer (20 to 17, with 8 abstentions).105 
These resolutions were passed by what is described as the U.N.’s principal 
body dedicated to the protection of human rights.106  The Council framed its 
findings and recommendations in human rights affirming language.  But the 
resolutions are hostile to the real protection of human rights.  They severely 
restrict the freedoms of expression and religion.  They can be used to justify bans 
on any critical discussion of religion as well as mission work. 
The hypocrisy of these resolutions and efforts is evident when examining the 
religious freedom records of nations supporting these efforts.  For example, 
China, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan supported both of these resolutions and are 
all recognized as major violators of religious freedom.  At the time these 
resolutions were passed, the U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom recommended that the State Department designate each of these 
nations as “countries of particular concern,” being engaged in serious violations 
of religious freedom under the International Religious Freedom Act.107 
In 2010, the same year the Human Rights Council passed its second 
Defamation of Religions resolution, the Commission on International Religious 
Freedom found the following regarding China: 
In China, the government continues to engage in systematic and 
egregious violations of the freedom of religion or belief . . . . The 
government continues its campaign to “transform” unregistered 
Christian groups and “strike hard” against “evil cults,” leading to the 
arrest, imprisonment, and mistreatment of religious adherents.  
Thousands of “house church” Protestants have been detained in the 
past two years.108 
                                                 
 102. Id. at para. 8. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Human Rights Council Res. 13/16, U.N. Doc. A/13/16, at 2 (Apr. 15, 2010). 
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 108. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2010) [hereinafter 
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liberty in significant ways.  See USCIRF ANN. REP. 2017, supra note 98, at 32. 
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In the same year, the Commission found the following with regard to Saudi 
Arabia: 
Systematic, egregious, and ongoing religious freedom violations 
continue in Saudi Arabia . . . . [T]he Saudi government persists in 
banning all forms of public religious expression other than that of the 
government’s own interpretation of one school of Sunni Islam, and 
interferes with private religious practice of both Muslims and non-
Muslim expatriate workers.109 
Again in 2010, the Commission made the following findings regarding religious 
freedom in Pakistan: 
Serious religious freedom concerns persist in Pakistan, where 
religiously discriminatory legislation has fostered an atmosphere of 
intolerance . . . .  A number of Pakistan’s laws abridge freedom of 
religion or belief . . . .  Blasphemy laws have been used to silence 
members of religious minorities and dissenters within the majority 
Muslim community, and frequently result in imprisonment on account 
of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence.110 
In the end, defending “defamation of religion” prohibitions as promoting 
human rights is hypocritical.  Supporting nations employ the doctrine to 
“promote human rights” while they deny citizens religious liberty and freedom 
of expression.  It is just another example of how states use the language of human 
rights to thwart human rights. 
In sum, the unquestioned push of the human rights movement to expand the 
number and scope of human rights—and the use of rights talk—is an act of 
hubris.  This expansion will not inevitably lead to greater protection for human 
rights, despite our greatest hopes and intentions. States do not always engage in 
human rights-related activities in good faith.  Some ratify human rights 
instruments with no intention of complying with their terms.  Some use human 
rights language and institutions in ways that infringe human rights.  The 
expansion of human rights and rights talk is not just fruitless, it can be 
dangerous. 
II. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND LIMITATIONS ON POWER IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BODIES 
The second manifestation of the human rights movement’s hubris is its 
creation of enforcement bodies that lack critical checks, limitations, and 
accountability.  This is an odd phenomenon.  Human rights advocates of all 
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people know how crucial limitations on power and accountability are.  The 
importance of such limitations flows through our human rights conventions, 
especially those dealing with civil and political rights.  One example is Article 
9 of the ICCPR: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.  No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law . . . . 
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful.111 
Accountability and checks on authority—issues central to the rule of law—
are among the most important topics of discussion for human rights enforcement 
bodies when they address the enforcement of human rights within the individual 
nations.112  Why?  We know from painful experience that unaccountable rulers 
and regimes hold themselves above the law and abuse others, especially the most 
vulnerable among us. 
When the American framers drafted and defended the United States 
Constitution, they were particularly mindful of the importance of not 
consolidating power in the hands of one office or official.  With a realistic view 
of human nature, they vigorously championed the need for checks and balances.  
Consider the following language from THE FEDERALIST NO. 51: 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.  The interest of the 
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.  It 
may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be 
necessary to controul the abuses of government.  But what is 
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?  
If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on 
government would be necessary.  In framing a government which is 
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in 
the next place, oblige it to controul itself.113 
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It is universally accepted that the rule of law is essential to protecting human 
rights.114  States can have elegant and well-tailored laws.  They can ratify 
comprehensive and clear human rights conventions.  But absent on-the-ground 
enforcement, the benefits of those laws and conventions will not be experienced 
by the average citizen. 
Importantly, the rule of law is just as crucial to the just operation of human 
rights enforcement bodies as it is to the states they monitor.  Human rights 
enforcement bodies will only be effective and act with justice if they too act 
through law and under the law.  As Gisela Hirschmann argues: “[A]chieving 
global accountability for human rights violations would mean to establish 
accountability checks for global governance institutions and non-state actors as 
well.”115  The human rights movement cannot just promote checks, balances, 
and accountability; it must model them. 
A. International Institutions Generally 
Too often, the attributes of transparency, accountability, and limitations on 
power are lacking in our international bodies.  Speaking of the United Nations 
two decades ago, one commentator declared: “The United Nations has become 
a Kafkaesque bureaucracy beset by inefficiency, systematic corruption, and 
misconceived programs.  Numerous diplomatic efforts to encourage UN reform 
have failed.”116 
Why would this be?  The answer returns us to human nature as discussed in 
the introduction.  Though we see evil that must be confronted, we have an overly 
optimistic view of human nature in general—and certainly of the individuals and 
institutions dedicated to promoting human rights.  In our hubris, we assume that 
if we create a body to enforce something as noble as human rights, that body 
will act nobly to do so—without the need to impose significant checks, 
limitations, and accountability.  But we are wrong.  Good intentions are not 
enough. 
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https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
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Professor Jan Klabbers, Dutch Academy Professor at the University of 
Helsinki reviewed the presence of checks and balances in international 
organizations and concluded: 
[T]here are few, if any, general rules in international institutional law 
concerning checks and balances.  Partly, this may be a variation 
perhaps on James Madison’s “melancholy reflection” that no 
government would be necessary if men were angels.  International 
organizations were, for a long time, supposed to do only good, be 
angelic in nature, and thus checks and balances were hardly even 
discussed.117 
The impact of the failure to insist upon accountability is significant.  Our 
enforcement bodies are too often embroiled in scandal and corruption, and the 
rights of the vulnerable are at times trampled upon.118  Frequently, these bodies 
shelter wrongdoers rather than calling them out.119 
The U.N. is obviously central to the promotion of human rights.  It has 
generated some of the most important human rights documents, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and important treaties such as the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR.  It manages some of the most significant human rights 
enforcement bodies in the world such as the Human Rights Council and the 
Human Rights Committee, which is the body tasked with enforcing the 
ICCPR.120  Additionally, the U.N. regularly affirms the rule of law and the 
values of transparency and accountability.  For example, in 2015, in its 
concluding observations regarding Venezuela’s compliance with the ICCPR, the 
Human Rights Committee urged Venezuela to: 
(b) Ensure that all human rights violations, including those that may 
have been committed by private individuals with the acquiescence of 
State officials, are investigated promptly, thoroughly, independently 
and impartially and that the perpetrators are brought to justice and, if 
found guilty, are punished in accordance with the gravity of their acts; 
. . . 
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(d) Ensure that no one is detained arbitrarily and that all persons who 
are charged with an offence have access to a fair and impartial trial.121 
Despite its public support for the values of transparency and accountability, 
the United Nations has also demonstrated considerable failures to achieve these 
values.  One of the most egregious has come to the fore in the last two years 
regarding the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers around the world.  The United 
Nations has engaged in more than seventy peacekeeping operations since its 
inception, deploying hundreds of thousands of soldiers and tens of thousands of 
civilians and law enforcement officials from more than 120 participating 
countries.122 
In April 2017, the Associated Press revealed the results of a comprehensive 
investigation of U.N. peacekeeping efforts in twenty-three nations over twelve 
years between 2004 and 2016.123  It found widespread evidence that 
peacekeepers frequently acted as predators of the populations they were sent to 
protect.124  It found over 2,000 allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers; 300 
of those involved children.125 
Similarly, Human Rights Watch in 2016 reported that U.N. peacekeepers in 
the Central African Republic had “killed more than a dozen people, including 
women and children . . . [between] December 2013 [and] June 2015.”126  
Furthermore, peacekeepers were accused of “rampant sexual abuse, including 
against more than 100 girls in a single prefecture in the Central African 
Republic.”127 
How could such abuses be perpetrated by the very people who were sent to 
protect the poor, vulnerable, and oppressed?  The U.N. is largely left to self-
police its activities and personnel.  Miranda Brown, who monitored peacekeeper 
abuses while working at the U.N.’s Office for the High Commissioner for 
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Human Rights, declares: “The real problem is that the UN’s leadership are only 
accountable to themselves.”128 
Brett Schaefer, the Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs 
for the Heritage Foundation, insists that the U.N. fails in this effort at self-
policing: “The United Nations and its employees enjoy broad immunities that 
insulate them from external accountability.  This places a heavy responsibility 
on the U.N. to self-police and self-correct.  Unfortunately, it has instead earned 
a reputation for opacity and retaliating against those who report misdeeds by 
U.N. officials and peacekeepers.”129 
The U.N. has been notoriously slow in responding to allegations of 
misconduct.  After a review of leaked internal U.N. documents, Bloomberg 
reported that “damaging accounts keep surfacing, not only of abuse but of failure 
to investigate and act.”130  Peter Anthony Gallo worked from 2011 to 2015 with 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the office tasked with 
investigating allegations of U.N. “mismanagement, misconduct, waste of 
resources and abuses of authority.”131  Gallo worked eighteen years as an 
investigator in the private sector before coming to the United Nations.132  He 
testified to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “The UN has an incentive 
to misrepresent the number of misconduct cases—particularly Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse cases that are reported.  To do otherwise would be to 
discredit their own peacekeeping activities and to admit to the ineffectiveness of 
their own prevention activities.”133  Gallo likewise reported: “There is also a 
willingness to close cases—including sexual exploitation and abuse cases - 
rather than investigate them fully.”134 
While the OIOS exists to hold U.N. officials accountable and ensure that 
investigations are done, Gallo insists it does not work that way: 
Beholden to senior management for political patronage and other 
favours, OIOS management has been able to select which reports 
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should be investigated and which should be referred to another 
department (and conveniently lost or buried).  Potentially 
embarrassing cases have been closed in the face of evidence of fraud, 
sexual abuse or other misconduct.  There is a toxic working 
environment; some investigators have been harassed, experienced 
retaliation and encouraged to resign while serious misconduct 
complaints against some others have been ignored.135 
At times it appears that the U.N. is more concerned with protecting its 
reputation than actually addressing criminal acts by peacekeepers.  In 2015, 
frustrated with a lack of action by the Office of High Commissioner in response 
to allegations of peacekeeper abuse, Anders Kompass, field operations director 
at the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, leaked a report 
about alleged sexual abuse by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic, 
some of whom were French diplomats in Geneva.136  The U.N.’s response was 
to suspend Kompass.137  In 2016, Kompass resigned.  He expressed dismay at 
“the complete impunity for those who have been found to have in various 
degrees abused their authority . . . This makes it impossible for me to continue 
working there.”138  
The scope of and outcry over the peacekeeper scandal has naturally caused 
U.N. leadership to call for reform.139  But we have been here before.  Over a 
decade ago the world was stunned by similar allegations of sexual abuse by 
peacekeepers.140  In 2005, responding to both allegations of abuse by 
peacekeepers and mismanagement of the Iraq Oil for Food program,141  Deputy 
Secretary General of the United Nations Louise Fréchette declared: 
                                                 
 135. Id. at 9. 
 136. Foroohar, supra note 128. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Alexandra Olson, Pence Applauds U.N. Resolution on Peacekeeping Reform, ARMY 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.armytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/09/20/pence-
applauds-un-resolution-on-peacekeeping-reform/. 
 140. Louise Fréchette, The United Nations: Adapting to the Twenty-First Century, in 
IRRELEVANT OR INDISPENSABLE? THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14 
(Paul Heinbecker & Patricia Goff eds., 2005). 
 141. The program was designed in 1996 to support the Iraqi people and protect them from a 
humanitarian disaster after international sanctions were imposed in 1990.  It permitted the Iraqi 
government to engage in some oil sales so long as the proceeds were used for food, medicine and 
infrastructure.  However, Saddam Hussein manipulated the program to receive billions of dollars 
in kickbacks and illegal surcharges from oil sales.  See Sharon Otterman, Iraq: Oil Food Scandal, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 28, 2005), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-oil-food-
scandal (“Wide-scale mismanagement and unethical conduct on the part of some UN employees 
also plagued the program, according to the UN Independent Inquiry Committee.”). The Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was designed to prevent such corruption,.  The OIOS was 
created in 1994 after the United States withheld its contribution to support the U.N.’s work until 
the U.N. established an Inspector General to monitor and audit U.N. operations. Unfortunately, the 
450 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 68:425 
We are gravely concerned at the failures brought to light in the Oil-
for-Food Program, and appalled at the allegations of sexual abuse by 
UN staff and peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and elsewhere.  When problems come to light, you must act 
aggressively to fix them—and that’s what we’re doing.  The Secretary 
General is moving swiftly on issues within his own purview—for 
instance, new protections for whistleblowers, wider access to 
information, higher standards to avoid conflicts of interest or 
corruption by senior officials, and action to hold managers to 
account.142 
Without fundamental changes between 2005 and now, it is tempting to 
consider current U.N. assurances that reform is forthcoming with skepticism.  
However, the broader U.N. is not alone in a display of a lack of checks, 
transparency, and accountability.  Some of the most important human rights 
enforcement organizations suffer these same deficiencies.  We will look at two 
of these organizations. 
B. United Nations Human Rights Council 
The Human Rights Council has been described as the U.N.’s principal body 
dedicated to the protection of human rights.143  Yet it is a prime example of an 
organization that lacks basic checks and limitations.  The Human Rights Council 
was created in 2006 to replace a predecessor organization, the Human Rights 
Commission.144  The Commission played a crucial role in the promotion of 
human rights in the years following World War II.145  It was the drafter of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and important conventions, such as the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR.  It also played a role in investigating allegations of 
human rights violations.146 
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In the early 2000’s, however, the Commission became the subject of much 
scrutiny and criticism because of how politicized it had become.  The 
politicization showed itself both in its membership and activities.  The 
organization consisted of 53 member states “elected by the Economic and Social 
Council.”147  In 2001, the General Assembly voted the United States off the 
Commission while electing as members Cuba, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe — countries described by some as “a rogues’ gallery of human rights 
abusers.”148  Two years later in a secret ballot election, the Commission named 
Libya, a persistent human rights abuser, to be the Commission’s chair.149  By 
2005, Freedom House named six of the fifty-three member nations – China, 
Cuba, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe – among the world’s “worst 
of the worst” abusers of human rights.150 
The Commission, as constituted, proceeded to largely ignore major human 
rights violations in Myanmar and North Korea and even genocide in Sudan.151  
It chose not to look into the suppression of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia or 
journalists in Iran; it decided not to examine the intense political repression in 
Zimbabwe.152  One nation, however, was unprotected from criticism and 
censure: Israel.  There were as many country-specific resolutions against Israel 
as there were against all other nations combined, and the Commission held 
regular and special emergency sessions devoted to Israel.153 
Eventually, even U.N. leaders called for the Commission’s end.  U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged: “[T]he Commission’s capacity to 
perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility 
and professionalism.  In particular, States have sought membership of the 
Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against 
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criticism or to criticize others.”154  The General Assembly disbanded the 
Commission and created the Human Rights Council to take its place.155 
Given the Commission’s failures, there was much discussion of changes that 
should be put in place for the newly created Human Rights Council.  Many 
argued that the new body should be smaller and hopefully less unwieldy.  Sec. 
Gen. Kofi Annan proposed that elections for member nations should be done by 
a two-thirds vote, rather than a simple majority.156  The United States, a strong 
critic of the politicized Commission, called for the implementation of 
membership criteria.157  It argued that only nations with a track record of 
protecting human rights—and certainly not those subject to current United 
Nations sanctions—should be eligible for membership.158 
In the end, the General Assembly rebuffed most of these efforts.  It reduced 
the number of member states to forty-seven.159  But membership selection 
continues to be made by a majority vote and any nation, primarily based on 
equitable geographic distribution rather than on its human rights record, may be 
elected.160  Member states are simply told that they “shall uphold the highest 
standards in the promotion and protection of human rights.”161 
Why is membership open to human rights abusing nations?  Under-Secretary 
General Shashi Tharoor explained: “You don’t advance human rights by 
preaching only to the converted.”162  Professor Joseph Loconte, responding to 
Tharoor’s comment, notes the utopian impulse behind such a view: “Here on 
display is the flawed idealism of the UN’s human-rights agenda, as if having 
human-rights abusers judging human-rights cases is the way to convert them.”163 
So how should we assess the Human Rights Council after its first decade of 
existence?  Membership, a critical issue that plagued the predecessor Human 
Rights Commission, continues to be a problem.  Only twice has the majority of 
member nations been “free,” as evaluated by Freedom House.164  Blatant human 
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rights violators such as Cuba, China, and Saudi Arabia continue to judge their 
own human rights records and those of their friends and allies.165 
How does this happen?  Frequently states allied by a common interest or 
regional ties will vote in blocs.  One of the ways they accomplish this is to have 
regions submit slates for approval that have only as many candidates as open 
seats, a practice known as offering a “clean slate.”166  Ted Piccone, a senior 
fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and Latin America 
Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, supports 
the Council and the United States’ participation in it.  But he objects to non-
competitive slates, concluding: “In particular, the continued election of states 
like China, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela, in addition to newer members like 
Burundi and Ethiopia, is a sad testament to the General Assembly’s willingness 
to prioritize politics over principles.”167 
The Council, like the Commission before it, continues to be a highly 
politicized body.  In the first two years, some countries—such as Algeria, Cuba, 
and China—pushed to end review and scrutiny of the records of individual 
nations, “except in the case of Israel, which remained the subject of several 
annually adopted resolutions and mechanisms, and is the subject of the Council’s 
only country-specific agenda item.”168 
During the Bush administration, the United States chose not to seek 
membership in the Human Rights Council or to participate in its activities.169  
The United States changed course during the Obama administration and was 
voted to membership in 2009.170  Some feel that this improved the functioning 
of the organization; there are more country-specific resolutions now and a 
smaller percentage of those that condemn Israel.171 
Today, however, Israel continues to be the only nation singled out for scrutiny. 
It is the sole country with a standing agenda item dedicated to it: “Human rights 
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situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories.”172  There have been 
more resolutions against Israel than all other nations combined.173  This is 
remarkable given some of the horrific human rights violations that have occurred 
during the Council’s first decade, including genocide in Sudan and the military 
attacks against civilians (including the use of chemical weapons) launched by 
the Syrian government of Bashar al Assad.174  Indeed, while Israel has been the 
subject of seventy-eight resolutions, Sudan and Syria have been the subject of 
three and nine respectively.175 
While member states continue to target Israel, they also continue to use the 
system to protect themselves and their allies from censure.  In her book, Failing 
to Protect, Professor Rosa Freedman describes how a nation like Saudi Arabia, 
despite ratifying many human rights treaties, continues to deny religious liberty 
and engage in discrimination, torture, and summary executions: 
The country is protected by its Gulf neighbours, and by its political 
allies within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The country’s 
oil and wealth, its ties with the US, and its position amongst Muslim 
states means that other countries pay scant attention to its abuses and 
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care even less about holding the Saudi regime to account for its 
violations against its own citizens.176 
Finally, it is important in this context to recall that it is the Human Rights 
Council that has passed two resolutions on “Defamation of Religion.”177  By 
calling for restraints on speech in the name of human rights, the Council is 
undermining freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and human rights in 
general. 
In sum, the Human Rights Council continues to suffer from a lack of clear 
checks, balances, and accountability.  Without meaningful membership criteria 
and critical changes in the way member states are elected, we will continue to 
have politicization and debasement of the Council’s rights enforcement work. 
C. European Court of Human Rights 
Lack of institutional checks and accountability are not just a U.N. problem.  
They also infect the work of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
They do so, however, in a manner that is different from the Human Rights 
Council.  The ECtHR follows clear and detailed procedures.  The problem is not 
a lack of accountability in court structures, it is that the ECtHR’s approach to 
interpreting the European Convention of Human Rights lacks predictability, 
certainty, and accountability to the Convention’s text. 
The ECtHR is the primary enforcement body of the European regional system 
of human rights protection, formed under the auspices of Council of Europe.178  
The Council of Europe, like the U.N., was formed shortly after World War II to 
promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.179  The nations of Europe 
very quickly (by 1953) had not only created the Council of Europe, but they put 
into force a binding human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human 
Rights.180  Today, the ECtHR interprets and enforces that treaty.  It stands ready 
to hear petitions from any individual or group suffering a denial of human rights 
within Europe.181 
The ECtHR has had many successes.  It has protected religious liberty, 
including the right to evangelize.182  It has developed a strong jurisprudence 
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dealing with forced disappearances and protections for the lives of civilians 
during military operations, such as Russia’s intervention in Chechnya.183 
Unfortunately, the ECtHR uses a doctrine to interpret the European 
Convention that ultimately threatens the court’s credibility and ability to protect 
human rights: an evolutive interpretation of rights that is rooted in ascertaining 
the consensus of member states regarding the scope and application of particular 
rights.184  The ECtHR describes its approach this way: 
[S]ince the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection 
of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing 
conditions within the respondent State and within Contracting States 
generally and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as 
to the standards to be achieved . . . .  It is of crucial importance that 
the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders 
its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.  A failure 
by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would 
indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement.185 
Very consciously then, the ECtHR has embraced a role not only of 
Convention interpretation, but also human rights reform and development.  And 
central to this approach is monitoring legal and social developments within 
Europe relevant to the particular issue before the court. 
The ECtHR first used this evolutive approach in Tyrer v. United Kingdom in 
1978 when it held judicially imposing three strokes with a birch rod as 
punishment for assault constituted degrading treatment under Convention 
Article 3.186  The ECtHR continues to invoke the approach as an important part 
of its jurisprudence.187  It does so for a noble purpose: it wants the system of 
human rights protections in Europe to be relevant over time as technologies and 
societies change.  Unfortunately, the ECtHR uses this doctrine as a means of 
enforcing its own perspective—or its perception of current European thinking—
on good public policy, with at times little regard for the text of the convention 
that governs its existence and function.  The ECtHR is another example of a 
body that is well intentioned, but that demonstrates hubris as it determines social 
policy with little accountability. 
The ECtHR has used its evolutive approach especially in cases involving 
sexual rights and identity.  A good example is seen in a series of cases decided 
between 1986 and 2002 involving the United Kingdom and transgendered 
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individuals challenging the United Kingdom’s birth certificate record system.  
The transgendered individuals in each case insisted that the United Kingdom 
violated their right to “respect” for their “private and family life” under Article 
8 of the European Convention by refusing to allow them to change their birth 
certificates to reflect their new sexual identity.188  Consistently from 1986 to 
1998—in three separate cases—the ECtHR rejected the applicants’ claims and 
ruled in favor of the United Kingdom, finding that the United Kingdom had a 
“wide margin of appreciation” in establishing and maintaining its birth record 
system.189 
The ECtHR changed course in 2002.  That year, in Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR for the first time ruled for an applicant wishing to change 
her birth certificate.190  It found that the United Kingdom had failed to respect 
the applicant’s private and family life under article 8 by not allowing her to do 
so.191  The European Convention’s text had not changed between 1998 and 2002.  
The difference was that the ECtHR saw a change in society.  Europe and the rest 
of the world were taking steps toward greater acceptance of transsexuals, 
including greater legal protection. 
Throughout the period in which it decided this series of cases, the ECtHR 
consistently asked whether there was a “European consensus” on whether 
transgendered individuals should be permitted to change their birth 
certificates.192  Interestingly, in 2002 the ECtHR reached the same conclusion in 
Goodwin that it had before: such a consensus did not exist.193  How then did it 
reach the conclusion that the United Kingdom had violated article 8 of the 
convention?  The court explained that 
[w]hile this [lack of a European consensus] would appear to remain 
the case, the lack of such a common approach among forty-three 
Contracting States with widely diverse legal systems and traditions is 
hardly surprising.…  The Court accordingly attaches less importance 
to the lack of evidence of a common European approach to the 
resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear 
and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour 
not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal 
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recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative 
transsexuals.194 
Influential to the outcome was evidence of a “continuing international trend”  
found not within Europe, but primarily in New Zealand and Australia.195 
As curious as it is that the ECtHR employed an international trend to overturn 
its longstanding interpretation of Article 8, more troubling is how little the 
ECtHR looked to the language of the European convention.196  Indeed, in 
important respects the Goodwin opinion reads more like the report of a body of 
sociologists analyzing social developments in nations across the world than a 
judicial decision. 
The ECtHR used the same approach in the 2009 case of Vallianatos v. 
Greece.197  There applicant claimed that Greece violated the nondiscrimination 
principle of Article 14 of the Convention (read in conjunction with Article 8’s 
protection for private and family life) by excluding same-sex couples from 
application of its civil union law.198 
Greece explained why it applied its civil union law to heterosexual couples 
but not to same-sex couples by pointing to the law’s main purpose: the protection 
of children.  It argued the law would serve to protect the legal status of those 
born outside of marriage and make it easier for parents to raise children even if 
not married.199  It argued that, since same-sex couples could not have biological 
children, they were in a different position with regard to application of the law.200 
The ECtHR acknowledged that the protection of children was a legitimate 
aim.  However, it insisted that it was not “necessary” for Greece to exclude 
same-sex couples from application of law to protect this aim; it was possible to 
both protect children and extend the law’s benefit to same-sex couples.201 
The ECtHR cited both Tyrer and Goodwin in characterizing the Convention 
as “a living instrument, to be interpreted in present-day conditions.”202  In 
particular, it argued that Greece “must necessarily take into account 
developments in society and changes in the perception of social and civil-status 
issues and relationships, including the fact that there is not just one way or one 
choice when it comes to leading one’s family or private life.”203 
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As it had done in Goodwin, the ECtHR looked to see whether there was a 
consensus on how same sex couples should be treated under the law; again it did 
not find it.204  Nonetheless, it found “a trend is currently emerging with regard 
to the introduction of forms of legal recognition of same-sex relationships.”205  
It highlighted the number of states that permitted same-sex marriage as well as 
those that permitted civil partnerships for same-sex couples.  It noted that 
Lithuania and Greece were the only states that did not permit civil partnerships 
to apply to same-sex couples.206 
The ECtHR addressed a natural concern that arises from such an analysis—
that once a consensus or trend develops, it will be impossible for one nation to 
have laws that differ from the majority.  It insisted that being “in an isolated 
position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that 
that aspect conflicts with the Convention.”207  However, this concession was not 
enough to help Greece.  The court found that Greece failed to offer “convincing 
and weighty reasons” capable of justifying its law.208 
The Villianatos reasoning is troubling.  Once again, the ECtHR determined 
the meaning of a convention provision based in large part on a developing social 
trend.  While the ECtHR briefly referenced the text, very little of its analysis was 
spent on the textual analysis.  The ECtHR was engaged primarily in social 
analysis and prognosis.209 
The parties expected this approach.  The way they engaged in advocacy in the 
case demonstrates that they understood that social consensus would prove key 
to analysis.  Indeed, the existence of a consensus and/or trend was a central 
argument raised by both the applicants and the nongovernmental organizations 
that participated in the case as third-party interveners.  The applicants 
emphasized the trend toward legal recognition of same-sex couples throughout 
Europe.210  And they insisted that Greece was “clearly and radically out of step 
with the norm among European countries in that regard.”211 
Similarly, the interveners canvassed legal developments regarding the 
treatment of same-sex couples and argued that “Greece was unique, as it was the 
only European country to have introduced civil unions while excluding same-
sex couples from their scope of application.”212 
                                                 
 204. Id. at 31, para. 91. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 32, para. 92. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See generally id. (reiterating the courts obligation to take into account societal changes in 
its analysis). 
 210. Id. at 21, para. 60. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 25, para. 69. 
460 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 68:425 
It is not just in matters of sexual rights or identity that the ECtHR applies this 
evolutive approach based on consensus.  The ECtHR similarly did so in a 2013 
decision involving criminal punishment: Vinter v. United Kingdom.213  There, 
the ECtHR ruled that a United Kingdom law permitting life sentences without 
the prospect of release or possibility of review amounted to inhuman or 
degrading treatment in violation of Convention Article 3.214 
In Vinter, too, the ECtHR based its decision much more on its interpretation 
of current trends in European social policy than on an interpretation of the 
Convention’s language.  It found particularly significant that rehabilitation is 
“now” the main “emphasis” of European penal policy: “[t]he Court has already 
had occasion to note that, while punishment remains one of the aims of 
imprisonment, the emphasis in European penal policy is now on the 
rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, particularly towards the end of a long prison 
sentence.”215  Similarly, “there is also now clear support in European and 
international law for the principle that all prisoners, including those serving life 
sentences, be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release 
if that rehabilitation is achieved.”216  To bolster its conclusion on this front the 
ECtHR canvassed not only European penal law, but also penal trends around the 
world.217 
Having found that penal law had moved in the direction of rehabilitation, the 
ECtHR ruled that Article 3 now requires that every punishment must provide for 
the possibility of rehabilitation.218  This includes life sentences: “[T]he Court 
considers that, in the context of a life sentence, Article 3 must be interpreted as 
requiring reducibility of the sentence . . . .”219  Thus, though Article 3 says 
nothing about rehabilitation—or any theory of punishment at all—the ECtHR 
determined that life sentences without the possibility of release or review are 
inhuman or degrading.220 
In a partially dissenting opinion, Judge Villiger highlighted the decision’s lack 
of rooting in the Convention’s text: “To begin with, I note that in the judgment 
(for example, at §§ 121 et seq.) reference is made to the ‘standards’ and 
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‘requirements’ of Article 3.  However, nowhere in the judgment are these 
standards and requirements explained, analysed and applied.”221 
Why should we be concerned by the ECtHR’s evolutive approach?  First, the 
approach undermines the rule of law.222  The rule of law values predictability, 
certainty, and equal application of the law.  The ECtHR itself insists that such 
values are vital.223  But the evolutive approach undermines these very values.  In 
Goodwin, the United Kingdom had no way to know that the emergence of a 
trend outside of Europe would prompt the ECtHR to rule differently than it had 
in three previous cases over a 16-year period.  Critically, the ECtHR does not 
tell us how one knows if a consensus or trend has been achieved or even what a 
trend is.  There is no legal standard to be applied.224 
The ECtHR has created uncertainty regarding other important human rights 
questions in Europe as states wait to see if or when the ECtHR will declare that 
a consensus exists.  In Lambert v. France, for example, the ECtHR refused to 
determine that removal of artificial hydration and nutrition would violate Article 
2’s right to life, concluding that there is no consensus among member states 
regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.225  Similarly, in 
Hämäläinen v. Finland, the ECtHR found that there is no consensus on whether 
recognition of same sex marriage is required by Article 8’s requirement that 
states respect private and family life.226  Rather than providing clarity and 
certainty on these important issues, the ECtHR approach instead creates 
uncertainty for states and individuals about how these issues will be resolved in 
the years to come.  Euthanasia and same-sex marriage are hotly debated topics 
worldwide, and laws regarding them are changing.  At what point will those 
changes amount to a consensus or trend sufficient for the ECtHR to reinterpret 
the convention’s requirements?  No one knows.  In fact, no one knows exactly 
what evidence will be sufficient to show that the consensus threshold has been 
reached. 
It is inherently problematic basing decisions about fundamental human rights 
on the shifting sands of contemporary social policy.  European penal policy may 
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“now” be rooted in rehabilitation, but that may well change.  In the United States, 
rehabilitation was the dominant philosophy in early part of 20th century, but then 
fell out of favor as many of rehabilitation’s weaknesses became apparent as 
crime rates rose in the second half of the century.227  Eugenics and compulsory 
sterilization, too, once comported with current trends and accepted notions of 
the best social policy both in Europe and the United States.228  Something as 
important as human rights should not depend on the current state of social trends. 
The ECtHR is not only crafting European social policy, it is doing so with few 
checks, balances, or accountability.  There is no appellate court with jurisdiction 
to review ECtHR decisions.229  There is only the possibility of a case being 
reviewed by a grand chamber (17 judges) of the same court or some political 
intervention by the Committee of Ministers.230  And especially troubling, the 
doctrine means that the ECtHR is not truly accountable to the text of the 
Convention.  In cases like Vinter and Goodwin, the text played a very small role 
in the cases’ outcomes. 
The second problem with this evolutive approach is that it undermines the 
ECtHR’s very purpose—the protection of human rights.  A consensus is a 
strongly majoritarian concept.  But by their nature, human rights are counter-
majoritarian.  Individuals have rights that must be protected even if those in 
power or if the majority in a nation choose not to recognize those rights.  So, it 
is inherently problematic to base the determination of the nature and scope of 
human rights on the consensus of nations.  
The response of ECtHR’s defenders is that the ECtHR only uses its evolutive 
approach to expand, rather than contract, the protection of rights.  But there is 
no reason to believe that this will always be the case.  In fact, it is not the case 
now.  Consider the 2010 judgment in Mangouras v. Spain.231  In Mangouras, 
the ECtHR relied on trends in the way environmental crimes are viewed within 
Europe to restrict the right to bail for a criminal defendant in an oil leak case.232  
Apostolos Ioannis Mangouras was the ship’s master on the Prestige, which 
leaked 70,000 tons of fuel oil into the Atlantic Ocean of the coast of Spain in 
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2002.233  The leak had a devastating effect on marine life, the fishing industry, 
and tourism.234 
Once Mangouras was arrested, the judge set bail at 3 million euros, a figure 
Mangouras was unable to pay and which resulted in him spending much pre-
trial time in jail.235  He alleged that this bail violated Article 5(3) of the 
Convention, which provides: “Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article … shall be entitled to trial within 
a reasonable time or to release pending trial.  Release may be conditioned by 
guarantees to appear for trial.”236 
The ECtHR acknowledged that the purpose of bail under the Convention is 
“to ensure not the reparation of loss but, in particular, the appearance of the 
accused at the hearing.”237  Thus bail should take into account the means of the 
accused as well as the risk that he or she will abscond before trial.238  How then 
did the ECtHR uphold a bail amount that was so high and well beyond the 
accused means to pay?  The ECtHR conceded that it could not ignore the 
“growing and legitimate concern both in Europe and internationally in relation 
to environmental offences.”239  The court acknowledged “that these new realities 
have to be taken into account in interpreting the requirements of Article 5 § 3 in 
this regard.”240 
The “new realities” referenced by the ECtHR are social trends that have taken 
place regarding oil spills and our response to them, and the ECtHR relied on 
these “new realities” to change its interpretation of Article 5.  It allowed Spain 
to set bail, not primarily based on ensuring Mangouras’ appearance at trial, but 
instead based on the seriousness of the offences in question and the extent of 
damage caused.241 
The seven dissenting judges (the outcome was by a 10–7 decision) insisted 
strongly that the ECtHR was reinterpreting Article 5 just for cases like this.242  
Had this been an ordinary case—and not one involving a high-profile 
environmental disaster—the ECtHR would likely have ruled the other way.  To 
the dissenters the gravity of the offense must not be the “decisive factor 
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justifying the size of the bail.”243  The fact that it was the decisive factor here 
rendered “illusory the applicant’s ability to secure his release from custody.”244 
This is just one example of how human rights protections may contract rather 
than expand through use of the evolutive approach.  As incidents of global 
terrorism continue to increase, we may find that a future consensus on 
appropriate means to combat that terrorism may embrace stronger measures and 
more infringements on freedom of expression or privacy—perhaps even 
infringements that would be viewed as human rights violations today. 
It is simply not the case that a consensus approach will only expand our 
protection of human rights.  The evolutive approach and the consensus standard 
are threats to both the rule of law and the protections of human rights. 
The ECtHR, for all of its successes, is another example of a human rights 
enforcement entity that lacks sufficient checks, balances, and accountability.  
And this lack poses a threat to the long-term protection of human rights. 
III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
How are we as human rights advocates to confront not only the evil around us 
but the evil—particularly the hubris—within?  There are several concrete steps 
we need to take so that the human rights movement will be effective in 
confronting evil and protecting the dignity of all human beings for generations 
to come. 
First, it is time to change the human rights movement’s aim from further 
expansion of rights to enforcement of core rights to which states have already 
agreed.  As Professor David Smolin notes: “It is an odd feature of the human 
rights movement that although it has failed to successfully implement principles 
with broader acceptance, such as the bans on genocide, slavery, and torture, it 
has continued to define ever more specific and controversial additional 
rights.”245 
We don’t need additional working groups articulating increasingly vague and 
largely non-enforceable aspirations and calling them human rights.  We recently 
spent six years carefully crafting a right to peace.246  While world peace is a 
noble aspiration, and one to which the nations of the world should work, that 
declaration will do little to actually bring about peace.  Such efforts only distract 
us and dilute our efforts. 
Worse, our expansion of the body of “rights” actually harms our ability to 
enforce agreed upon rights.  With over 1300 possible individual obligations (at 
least for European nations) and the notion that all rights are equal, we are 
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unwittingly giving cover to repressive regimes to shield human rights abuses and 
even use the language of rights in a disingenuous way that works to undermine 
real rights enforcement. 
Emilie Hafner-Burton has it right: 
It probably sounds counterintuitive, but halting the production of more 
such laws, bureaucracy, and treaty bodies might pave the way for 
giving the international legal system more force and reach . . . .  Thus, 
the first way to make reforms more feasible is to stop the system’s 
swell of obligations and procedures.  A pause would give reforms a 
better chance to work.247 
Beyond just halting the growth of new human rights institutions and norms, 
however, we need to turn our attention to actual enforcement.  This will mean 
placing our energy and focus on fewer and more core rights.  We should put a 
spotlight on those rights that are most foundational to human life and dignity—
and those that are crucial for functioning justice systems—and then work 
diligently for their enforcement.  Aspirational goals are inspiring, but 
enforceability ought to be a key criterion for where we should put our efforts.  
So should protecting life and ending violence.  A helpful start would be to focus 
on those rights declared by the Universal Declaration that are subject to actual 
monitoring and enforcement.  Our time and efforts should be devoted to such 
fundamental rights as the right to life, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom 
from arbitrary arrest, free speech and religion, etc. 
We need humility.  Hubris thwarts and may ultimately destroy our work.  We 
should instead focus on modest and achievable goals.  In his book, The Last 
Utopia, Samuel Moyn presents a choice that confronts the movement: embrace 
either a utopian and maximalist political vision or a set of minimalist ethical 
norms.  While the former may be inspirational and wonderful for rhetorical 
purposes, we need the latter to actually make an impact.  In terms of our effort 
and financing, our focus must be on the enforceable rather than the purely 
aspirational. 
Second, we should direct our efforts very intentionally toward enforcement of 
the rule of law around the world.  As described above, we do not have a problem 
with too few human rights conventions with detailed norms.  If anything, we 
have too many.248 
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In the same way, many nations have strong, well-tailored laws.  Take human 
trafficking, for example.  Five nations with large numbers of enslaved 
individuals include: India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Uzbekistan.249  
Each has a law forbidding purchase and sale of human beings.250  India’s law is 
excellent.  Indian Penal Code (IPC) Section 370 “prohibits slavery, servitude, 
and most forms of sex trafficking and prescribes penalties ranging from seven 
years to life imprisonment, which are sufficiently stringent and commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape.”251  The problem is 
that too often these laws go unenforced. And without enforcement, they are 
meaningless to the average citizen. 
Nearly a decade ago, a United Nations report observed that “most poor people 
do not live under the shelter of the law, but far from the law’s protection.”252  
While poverty levels are lower than they once were, in 2008, approximately 2.5 
billion people lived on less than $2 per day.253  And the poor are particularly 
vulnerable to lawlessness.  Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros, in their book, The 
Locust Effect, conclude that the poor “are—by the hundreds of millions—
threatened every day with being enslaved, imprisoned, beaten, raped, and 
robbed.”254 
Sadly, those people live in places where there are criminal laws and where 
police, prosecutors, and judges purport to enforce that law.  Yet in many 
communities, law enforcement fails because the rule of law is absent. 
How does this occur?  Too often, police are a danger rather than a protection.  
In a large-scale study of poverty, the World Bank concluded: “Particularly in 
urban areas, poor people perceive the police not as upholding justice, peace and 
fairness, but as threats and sources of insecurity.”255  Why?  In many places, a 
shortage of officers and low pay induce some to act corruptly.  And while most 
police officers are dedicated to doing right, too many engage in extortion, sexual 
assault, and abusive detention.256 
Effective law enforcement can fail at the level of prosecutors and judges, too.  
Sometimes the failure is simply a result of overwhelming and unmanageable 
caseloads.  In Uganda, children sometimes sit in remand homes for years 
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because the justice system is not equipped to process cases appropriately.257  
Children in such situations, even when guilty, can serve more time in pretrial 
detention than they would have served in total after a just sentence.258  Even 
worse, where judges and prosecutors are underpaid and overworked, they can 
turn to extortion and other abuses of power.  Haugen and Boutros note the impact 
this has: “Throughout much of the developing world, the prosecution segment 
of the justice pipeline has been allowed to gradually collapse into a nearly 
impenetrable barrier to meaningful enforcement of the law.”259 
Where is human rights law in all of this?  We can have the most compelling, 
well-written declarations and conventions, but they will be meaningless without 
basic law enforcement.  Haugen and Boutros conclude: “There are billions for 
whom the promise of the human rights revolution remains a check they cannot 
cash.”260 
Rather than creating more conventions, we need to focus our attention on 
combating violence through real, on the ground law enforcement.  Some nations 
have done this with success.  While it struggles with certain things, the nation of 
Georgia is an example of a nation that has made real progress on law 
enforcement by making the rule of law a priority.261  Those associated with the 
human rights movement must have a critical role of coming alongside nations 
and supporting them in enforcing their own domestic laws. 
The work needed to promote the rule of law in concrete ways in some aspects 
parallels changes that have taken place in the world of development economics 
over the past fifteen years.  Like the movement to promote human rights, the 
movement to end poverty in the developing world has long been characterized 
by a strong utopian streak.  In 1857, utopian socialist Robert Owen wrote: 
that science which in its natural progress will ultimately develope the 
means by which, with the certainty of a law of nature, the human race 
shall be perpetually well born, fed, clothed, lodged, trained, educated, 
employed, and recreated, locally and generally governed, and placed 
to enjoy life in the most rational matter one arth, and to best fit them 
for whatever change may occur after death.262 
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Owen’s grand vision is not much different from the one articulated in the 2000 
United Nations Millennium Goals to “eradicate extreme hunger and poverty,”263 
and to “achieve universal primary education”264 by 2015.  MDG defenders such 
as Professor Jeffrey Sachs argued that extreme poverty could be ended within a 
short time if nations simply double their anti-poverty spending.265 
In 2006, a year after Sach’s bold call to end extreme poverty, NYU professor 
William Easterly released the very influential book, The White Man’s Burden: 
Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little 
Good.266  He argued that utopian goals, while inspiring, were actually fruitless 
and even counterproductive.267  Easterly described how the developmental 
economic community sought for years to reduce poverty through top-down 
approaches that ignored the realities and complexities within individual settings 
and nations.268  That movement, like the human rights movement, demonstrated 
a hubris that championed lofty and noble aims, but frequently did not actually 
achieve them. 
Encouragingly, in the last decade, there has been a move toward greater use 
of on-the-ground solutions empowering what Easterly describes as searchers—
people who respond to concrete needs and provide concrete solutions—rather 
than planners who embrace a top-down approach.  Indeed, as individuals and 
nations have followed focused and modest prescription, they have seen real 
successes on certain key issues.  For example, Kenya saw a sharp drop in Malaria 
nationwide after undertaking a mass bed net distribution in 2006 and 2007.269  
The Kenyans used data from past efforts, both successes and failures, and 
catered the program to the specific context of their country.270  As another 
example, starting in 2011, Nigeria spurred economic growth through a creative 
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national business plan competition in which entrepreneurs were given $50,000 
to start a new business or expand an existing one.271 
Professor Eric Posner summarizes the significant changes that have occurred 
in the development economic world this way: 
Much greater attention is paid to the minutiae of social context, as it 
has become clear that a vaccination programme that works well in one 
location may fail in another, for reasons relating to social order that 
outsiders do not understand.  Expectations have been lowered; the goal 
is no longer to convert poor societies into rich societies, or even to 
create market institutions and eliminate corruption; it is to help a 
school encourage children to read in one village, or to simplify lending 
markets in another.272 
In his book, The Endtimes of Human Rights, Stephen Hopgood has a similar 
prescription for the human rights movement.  He says that it is time to promote 
“human rights” rather than “Human Rights.”  By “Human Rights” he means the 
top-down edifice of human rights enforcement: “a global structure of laws, 
courts, norms, and organizations that raise money, write reports, run 
international campaigns, open local offices, lobby governments, and claim to 
speak with singular authority in the name of humanity as a whole.”273  He 
captures the hubris of “Human Rights” by describing it as: “a kind of secular 
monotheism with aspirations to civilize the world.”274 
In contrast, by “human rights,” Hopgood means the activists on the ground 
who “combat [ ] violence and privation.”  They raise awareness, put pressure on 
governments, and “demand their own freedom and justice in whatever language 
they prefer.  These ethical and political claims are rooted in our shared interest 
in fair and equal treatment.”275 
Human rights can be used tactically to help prevent torture, 
disappearances, or extrajudicial executions or to demand economic 
and social rights to food, water, and health care.  It is a flexible and 
negotiable language.  It does not “defend human rights,” it defends the 
person.  It is a means, not an end in itself.276 
Hopgood is exactly right that we should direct our efforts to on-the-ground 
protection of individuals from violence, oppression, and slavery.  In doing so, 
we move from utopian dreams—and our own hubris—and put the protection of 
individuals front and center. 
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Of course, as we engage in the hard, on-the-ground work of promoting the 
rule of law, we still need international enforcement bodies.  The third and final 
recommendation is that in every international organization, we must insist on 
transparency and accountability, with checks and balances.  The discussion 
above analyzed two human rights enforcement bodies in depth, the Human 
Rights Council and the ECtHR.  The Human Rights Council desperately needs 
meaningful membership criteria.  There should be a minimal standard of human 
rights compliance before a nation may stand for election.  Election should be 
done by a two-thirds vote and clean slates should not be permitted.  The Council 
rightfully should be a respected and effective instrument of human rights 
enforcement.  It cannot be so without fundamental changes like these.  We need 
to restructure the Human Rights Council before it suffers the same humiliating 
end that came to the Human Rights Commission before it. 
The ECtHR must embrace humility and accountability as well.  The judges 
must recognize that they are not the platonic guardians of European social 
policy.  Above all, they need to exercise the discipline of faithfully interpreting 
and abiding by the Convention’s text.277  It is the text to which 47 nations have 
bound themselves, not ever-changing social trends as perceived by the current 
set of ECtHR judges.  It is the text alone that embodies any consensus that exists.  
By embracing an evolutive approach rooted in trends and consensus, the ECtHR 
is undermining its credibility and the ultimate enforceability of the key rights 
protected under the convention. 
Some will object that such a move would prevent the Council of Europe from 
responding to cultural changes and will leave human rights unprotected.  But 
this is not the case.  European states have now ratified 16 protocols to the 
European Convention on issues ranging from changing ECtHR procedures to 
banning the death penalty and articulating right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose one’s residence.278  This is not a situation where an 
amendment process exists in theory but is functionally unavailable.  Yet despite 
the receptivity of European states to new protocols, the ECtHR continues to 
enforce unratified norms through judicial fiat. 
Reform is needed for all international enforcement bodies, not just the two 
highlighted.  In any international organization, including and perhaps especially 
those enforcing human rights, there must be institutional commitments to 
transparency and accountability.  For instance, there must be independent 
oversight and, as Anthony Gallo has urged regarding the U.N. OIOS, there must 
be protection for whistle blowers.  Here as well, good motives are not enough.  
We need to work diligently to create organizations that will fulfill the purpose 
for which they were created. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The human rights movement is fueled by noble aspirations.  It has achieved 
much in the confrontation of evil and the promotion of fundamental rights 
around the world.  But in addition to confronting the evil in the world around us, 
it must also confront the evil within.  In particular, it must abandon hubris and 
embrace humility.  That includes humility in our aspirations and humility in the 
way we operate our organizations from day-to-day.  It means focusing attention 
on fewer and more core rights—those that are clear, enforceable, and protect 
individuals from violence.  It means implementing the rule of law so that the 
rights we declare are enjoyed by people on the ground.  And it means creating 
human rights organizations with checks and balances that model transparency 
and accountability.  In so doing we will better achieve the goal of protecting the 
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